

Oct 25, 1962 (WH typing)

Political path

This path has several branches, both as to the forum in which negotiations are carried out, and with regard to the steps to be taken.

With respect to the forum, we are already in the UN and this could be combined with private approaches on the side. We could follow up the U Thant proposals in order to get into prompt discussion with the Soviets. This is almost essential since the Soviets will almost certainly not put forward or indicate agreement to proposals publicly made.

Another method would be to propose or have someone such as U Thant propose a direct meeting with Khrushchev. He has publicly indicated his readiness for such a meeting in his letter to Bertrand Russell and could not have been expected, at this stage, to have made proposals directly to the President for fear of a rebuff. It would be difficult, however, for him to refuse an invitation from the President. A direct meeting would have to mean the continuance of the quarantine and would be difficult for us unless there was progress on proposals to ensure a standstill under UN control. It would probably involve discussions over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile bases in Turkey. A prompt proposal for an agreement to a meeting with Khrushchev might defer or avoid strong Soviet reaction to our stopping one of their ships.

As a background for political action that would have any hope of success, it would be important to minimize, so far as possible, any forceful action against Soviet vessels in carrying out the quarantine.

The following political actions might be considered:

1. A proposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory contiguous or in proximity of the territory of the other.
2. An alternative approach might be to have a proposal for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take control over the missiles there pending the outcome of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing such proposals.
3. Approach to Castro

An approach would be made to Castro through a Latin American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian Ambassador, pointing out that Cuba was merely being exploited in the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction. It could be pointed out that President Kennedy has stated that only two subjects were not negotiable between the US and Castro: military ties to the USSR and aggressive actions of any kind in Latin America.

If the Castro Government considers it has no freedom to act because of the presence of Soviet technicians, we would be prepared to undertake to deal with this problem. We would have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so.

Comment on K letter of 26 Oct, 27 Oct, and JFK reply of 8 pm 27 Oct

1. K simply doesn't make any offer to withdraw missiles; he says that given commitment, ~~would~~ he would make commitment ~~not~~ that Sov vessels bound for Cuba ((at the moment? or indefinitely!)) would not carry weapons; and that there would no longer be any "necessity" for Sov specialists, or armaments. But SU had already said--on Sept 11--that they had no "necessity" for missiles on Cuba: with which we could agree. This is--evidently--not tantamount to saying that they wouldn't put them there, or once there, would take them out.

2. The Oct 27 letter is, in fact, quite compatible with the Oct 26 letter (though not with F-S exchange). If missiles were "necessary," then a trade with Turkish missiles wouldn't be acceptable, so far as Cuba were concerned. But if they weren't necessary...they were available for bargaining; removal of the Turkish missiles would justify the trouble of taking them out.

3. The JFK letter purports to readx into the Oct 26 letter certain proposals--but these couldn't possibly be read into that letter. They just aren't there. This would be known not only to K but to anyone in Moscow who knew the K letter. If the ~~the~~ letter had~~not~~ been published shortly, the effect would have been most peculiar. What JFK was really referring to was the F offer. (Did X explain this ploy in his interview with Y?)

Oct 26, 1:10 pm

Pres. I think I spoke to you about this problem of the Italians and the Turks, whether we ought to get into some private negotiation and what conditions we would make that change.

Ball: Yes, we are just getting a telegram back. We've had one infrom Ankara and I'm expecting one from today.

P
Press: we were told of the substitution of the Polaris in place.

Ball: No, what we were doing, we are just querying our Embassies to see how they would react and get a political reading on it. The problem is that this, I ~~may~~ am having a study made, I think it may be ready now, on the involvement with NATO and how this thing has to be handled with the other NATO countries. We have got a little work going forward.

Pres: OK. It may be that we will want to make that offer at some point.

Ball: We are going forward.

5:45 pm.

Nitze: They are working on the Turkish problem is that right?

Ball: Yes there is a group working on it.

Nitze: We take a very dim view. We have to contemplate now, in this kind of a thing, negotiations apart from Cuba would just ruin us all the way around.

Ball--let me be quite clear.--we have no intention of seeing it pushed into negotiations. I am doing this at the Pres's request to see what it would be, if later on he wanted to consider it. The Department is no happier about it than you are.

Nitze..not that we love these things. We wanted to get rid of it before. It is really the political/military thing.

Ball--did you see a telegram I got in from Finletter this morning on this thing?

Nitze--Yes, I have it before me now. I just wanted to get my oar in while you are at this stage of the game.

Ball--the President wants work done on it.

Nitze--Sure. Thanks George.

Friday, Oct 26, 1962, 3:36 pm

phone, Stev--Sec

S finds rumors of invasion and that has upset everything and the Afro-Asians are alarmed. Apparently, White made some statements about further measures. S. Thinks it would be a good idea to clamp down any of that talk from Dept. or WH. ...S thinks there is an outside possibility with prompt assurances of no attack by US or exiles that we might short-circuit the whole thing and get the dismantling and withdrawal in exchange for assurances re Cuba. It indicates the Dept must start thinking about guarantees it would give rex territorial sovereignty by OAS ~~xxxx~~ others. Line they are taking is weapons are to deter attack by US and they, if they were sure US would not attack and had adequate commitments, would consider weapons unnecessary.

..If we can't short-circuit, there is the question of what constitutes the meaning of non-operable, etc. S hopes someone can look at this.

((meanwhile, letter had been sent; F-S meeting.))

(draft of instructions to Finletter, Oct 26?)

1. Last public letter of K indicates willingness to trade withdrawal of offensive missiles in Cuba for withdrawal of Jupiters in Turkey.
2. While we remain hopeful that deal can be made for denuclearizing Cuba on US promise to guarantee Cuba's territorial integrity we must realistically be prepared for possible deal to trade removal Turkish Jupiters for Cuban missiles.
3. This can be done without adversely disturbing balance nuclear power since obsolete Jupiters can be replaced by Polaris in Eastern med.
4. Immediate problem is to persuade NATO powers US is not capitulating nor is it trading away Europe's security to advance its own.
5. Among arguments to be made are following:
 - a) Existence of bases on the periphery of SU have long been an irritant and source of tension.
 - b) Sov nuclear power on the doorstep of the US is a menace to all NATO countries. This constitutes very large increment to Sov ability to destroy nuclear retaliatory power which is the central core of NATO security.
 - c) Because the US cannot accept this menace the alternatives are either a negotiated deal or a US air strike and probable invasion of Cuba.
 - d) Such a military action would mean great risk for all NATO countries. First, it would almost certainly invite Sov response elsewhere either against the Jupiter bases in Turkey and Italy or against Berlin or some other NATO target. Second it would immobilize substantial US forces possibly for a substantial period of time. Third it would involve a grave danger of escalation.
6. With the beginning today of Cuban action against US planes engaged in necessary surveillance of work on Cuban missile sites, the consequent destruction of an American U2 and the risk of increased losses in next two or three days with pressure for retaliation the situation is becoming hourly more grave and the President must have adequate freedom of action if he is to find a workable solution through negotiation.
7. In view of these circumstances regard it as urgent that you convene NAC meeting for Sunday afternoon.

Oct 27, 9:29 pm from USON

Lorin claimed Oct 26 letter to President was confidential message and was designed to "reduce tensions." Substantive proposal, he maintained, was in Oct 27 letter which was published.

Oct 26, 12:25 am; for Bonlen from Pres

Go to Colombey Sunday with letter and briefing material to Finletter: I am asking Amb. Bonlen to make sure that you are fully informed of the current situation in Cuba. The situation is clearly growing more tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in the next forty-eight hours ((from Sunday?)) the situation is likely to enter a progressively intense military phase.

We are trying to make our determination just as clear as our readiness for a proper settlement. It gives me great courage in these days to know that we have your support, as expressed in your last interview with Amb. Bonlen, and I should be glad to know of any further views you may have. ((drafted by Bundy, Johnson))

same to Dowling.

at same time: Oct 26 letter sent to Macmillan and de Gaulle.

Lur
draft, 27 Oct, telegram to Finletter, repeated to all NATO capitals

You should immediately call NAC meeting for Sunday afternoon
and outline urgent Cuban situation as follows:

1. Message from Khrushchev to President received night Oct 26, while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for commitment by US not invade Cuba. U Thant's conversations in New York also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.
2. However, these hopes have been dashed by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President (which has still not been officially received) ((last phrase deleted)) linking Cuban settlement to withdrawal of NATO Jupiters from Turkey.
3. Also in last twelve hours anti-aircraft has for first time opened fire on US planes engaged in necessary air surveillance of work on Cuban missile sites. One US aircraft has been destroyed (presumably by SAM which can only be manned by Soviet personnel) and one damaged by anti-aircraft artillery. Some Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward quarantine area in apparent violation of Khrushchev's assurances to U Thant. (Soviets were officially informed of area by both U Thant and US Gov.) At the present rate of speed first vessel will reach quarantine area during daylight Sunday and incident may occur.
4. US is facing grave decision which must be taken in next few hours with probability of increasing incidents. As Soviet linking Cuban situation with Jupiters in Turkey involves NATO, we desire urgently consult and obtain views of the NAC.
5. NAC will appreciate that regardless of dangers and risks, US cannot permit continuation build-up Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba which not only endangers US position but also jeopardizes retaliatory power which is deterrent core of NATO.
6. However, if solution cannot be promptly found within this framework, President will face hard decision either of seeking solution on terms involving Turkish Jupiters or launching massive air strike and probable invasion of Cuba to eliminate nuclear threat on US doorstep. We therefore urgently wish to consult with NAC on choice to be made, taking into account full implication of either course of action. Almost certain consequences of US military action against Cuba to destroy nuclear threat would be Soviet reprisal against Turkish Jupiters, Italian Jupiters, Berlin, or some other NATO target, with all the risks of escalation this would involve.

(and Ambassadors all NATO countries)
To Finletter: Oct 28, 12:12 AM (drafted McG Bundy, Johnson)

1. The President that your briefing of NATO be essentially factual and reflect clear determination of US Government to press on its present course as reflected in (1) White House statement issued noon Saturday on continuing buildup (2) President's message to Khrushchev released White House Saturday evening, 3) announcement by DOD of continued surveillance, and (4) DOD announcement call up of Air reserves (all contained wireless file).

2. You can report that message from Khrushchev to President received night Oct 26 (being repeated Finletter, Paris and London only), while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba ((not mentioned by K)) in exchange for commitment by US not invade Cuba. U Thant's conversations in New York and broad hints in Cuban speeches at UN also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.

These hopes have been diminished by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President linking Cuban settlement to withdrawal of NATO Junipers from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone.

3. The situation as we see it is increasingly serious and time is growing shorter. The US remains determined to insure removal of offensive installations in Cuba. We are combining reasonable diplomatic offers and military pressures in even balance to this end.

4. But construction on the missile sites continues and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, unarmed US military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire and one of these aircraft is missing.

5. At the same time, Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward the quarantine area in direct violation of Khrushchev's assurances to U Thant, although the Soviet Government was officially informed of the limits of the quarantine area by both U Thant and the US Gov. At the present rate of speed the first vessel will reach the quarantine area during daylight Sunday and an incident may occur.

6. In these circumstances the US Gov may find it necessary within a very short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the Hemisphere.

7. In the light of the developing possibility of the necessity for action in Cuba, the President has instructed you to bring this matter fully to the attention of the NAC. You should say that while the US holds to the position that this matter should be settled within framework of the Western Hemisphere, we have taken note of the public message to President of Oct 27 in which a connection is made between NATO defenses and Soviet action in Cuba. This Soviet position increases the possibility that US military action in Cuba may result in some Soviet moves against NATO. In these circumstances the US feels it essential to inform its allies and to consult with them on the general situation.

2.

8. FYI: It is of the utmost importance that nothing in your discussion should hint of any readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal, but it is equally important that you should allow free expression of European views, whatever they may be. In stimulating free response, you should strongly press the point that US action in Cuba--if it becomes essential--will be directed at a potential threat to the total strategic balance endangering other NATO countries at least as much as the US. end FYI

R.

Finletter to SecState, Oct 28, 1962, received 5:26 pm (sent 8 pm Paris)

report on special NAC meeting 1000 Oct 28.

(US paraphrased general US evaluation Sov policy, White House statement, Topol 578 (Pres briefing to NAC), and text Pres letter to K Oct 27).

Belgian opened questioning by asking whether Pres had flatly rejected Cuban-Turkish deal without leaving door open for some later negotiations. After some discussion and study White House statement, it agreed US position called for liquidation offensive missile bases Cuba before any other matters could be discussed or negotiated within or outside the general sphere of disarmament.

...UK then gave highlights of Home talk Oct 25 with Sov charge in which latter expressed hope UK would use influence prevent matters going over brink, to which Home replied Sov action in Cuba had upset balance and this must be redressed, and stated in reply to Sov question regarding quarantine that any country had the right to act in self-defense as best it saw fit. Home added in view of this obvious power play in Cuba, despite assurances to the contrary, it made it very difficult for the UK to work with SU when they did not tell the truth.

Belgian reiterated first ingredient was to get rid of the weapons in Cuba, after which it is most important to try to negotiate and work out other arrangements in disarmament as well as in other fields in order to lessen tension if possible and put Nato in best defensive position. He implied without going into details he had in mind working out some arrangements to replace Jupiters by more effective weapons. (He had volunteered rpt volunteered to me previously that he had in mind the desirability of setting up a NATO multilateral force in the Mediterranean to replace obsolete Jupiters in both Turkey and Italy). US assured Belgium that we not opposed to negotiations or arrangements in other fields as well as disarmament, and particularly not opposed to strengthen NATO defenses provided Cuban matter settled satisfactorily.

((Had Fin asked Belgian to express views? Had Belgian given idea of eastern MLF to Fin? Had Owen given it to Belgian?))

Norway stated his government supported the US position re Cuba generally and specifically that we must get rid of the weapons before any other settlement or arrangements could be made. He added however it was gratifying to learn that US did not oppose negotiations once threat and blackmail had ceased. Under instructions he urged that every effort be made to continue diplomatic action and avoid in every way possible direct action by use of force which might mean that matters would get completely out of hand.

2.

Turkey had no direct instructions but could draw on his general instructions to state that he was sure his govt would agree wholeheartedly with firm stand taken by President to turn down Jupiter deal. He added that it can be held that the Jupiters are obsolete, are lightning rods for attack and not too effective for defense of Turkey and NATO ingeneral, but regardless of their efficacy they should not be removed under threat or as part of any deal. Once Cuban matter has been settled NATO experts might talk about whether advisable remove Jupiters and how they might be replaced by other defensive weapons. But strongly emphasized no thought should be given to such suggestion until Cuban situation settled and Khrushchev's blackmail threat no longer existed. He added while he sure his govt desired eventual negotiations with Soviets they should not constitute in any way anything that might look like appeasement.

After Portugal had made a statement indicating solidarity with US, the Dane stated that while he had no instructions he sure his government took similar position to that of Norway and underlined that the Alliance should, of course, do everything to underline the deterrent. He added deterrent means to avoid war, and therefore hoped that efforts would be made to prevent hostilities from breaking out, since he feared West not now ready for major military engagement. Dane then asked whether there was any significant difference as to state of hostilities between pinpoint bombing of actual Soviet bases in Cuba and actual invasion of island to liquidate these bases. No one tried to answer his question.

Germany, again expressing full solidarity with US action, expressed fear that Cuba and Berlin might be more firmly linked in near future. There had been considerable slowdown in civilian traffic to Berlin, but whether this deliberate and fully connected with Cuba not clear. In any event, he urged that no matter what small or large harassments might take place, they should be resisted most firmly under present circumstances until Cuban matter settled.

Greek then made strong statement favoring US action underlining Jupiters are defensive weapons for the defense not just of Turkey but for all of NATO, and therefore (a) we should not negotiate on any points until Soviet missiles Cuba completely liquidated, and (b) President has been completely right in turning down any deal. Greek then outlined conversation Averoff and Sov Amb Athens in which latter took Greeks to task for firm pro-US position which could be catastrophic for Greece if persisted in. Averoff replied ~~that~~ firmly that Greece would stand by her alliance commitments and her principles. Greek perm rep again urged NATO solidarity statement re Cuba.

France (after first having told us he was checking with Quai) stated France backs US moves 100 percent, particularly on President's refusal make any deal re Jupiters. He pointed out if deal made on Jupiters Soviets might attempt establish bases other countries and then force deals for liquidation other NATO installations which would eventually completely break up alliance. ~~He personally thought~~ He added while his government did not always fully share our actions in trying to discuss matters with Soviets, he personally thought we were right in refusing negotiate now until Cuban missile bases fully liquidated. Personally he thought if Cuban matter could be satisfactorily liquidated and it would be clear to Khrushchev his coup had failed and West was solidly against his moves of this kind, it might then be advantageous to start negotiating with a somewhat chastened Khrushchev.

3.

Italy, speaking personally, stated he was certain his govt would agree with 'res' refusal any deal re Jupiters. He then asked whether this NAC meeting was for information or consultation, since US statements had emphasized we hoped to settle Cuban matter in context Western Hemisphere. US replied while the problem was basically one of Western Hemisphere, and therefore we would rely basically on our OAS Allies, it clear any action in any part of the world involving one NATO partner does affect entire NATO Alliance. Particularly true now that Khrushchev had linked Cuban Jupiters in Turkey. Therefore, the US not only wished to give Alliance information regarding developments, but desired to have support of the action we have taken, particularly in turning down Jupiter deal.

Belgian interjected that his govt definitely desired that consultations in fullest meaning of the word should continue during this entire crisis because developments could take place which vitally affect entire alliance.

Dutch, reiterating his govt's strong approval US action Cuba, stated that while he had no instructions, he sure his govt would back our action on Jupiters, since these are NATO weapons and any action to remove them, replace them, or make any other arrangements to cover the same defense needs must be passed by NATO as a whole. He then stated he impressed by Norwegian colleague's statement and hoped all efforts would be made to avoid use of force. However, since it may not be possible avoid use of force, NAC consultations must take place continuously. Dutch then emphasized while he agreed with others we might intensify discussions disarmament after Cuban matter settled, should not show more desire to make concessions in disarmament after Cuba settled because this would give impression to Khrushchev he had made gain by creating Cuban crisis.

(Iceland, Luxembourg backed US)

UK stated his understanding today's meeting was (1) to get consensus Council on action taken by US on Cuba particularly in regard to Jupiters; 2) to keep NAC informed as much as possible of developments; 3) to do as much as possible to forecast future developments in order that NAC might be prepared for all contingencies.

Belgian then brought up fact that there were many rumors that the US was planning unilateral bombardment of Cuba without any warning, consultation with NAC or with UN. US replied could not give an answer to this matter, since such decision might be governed primarily by military question, but stated we would try to consult wherever we could, but one could not guarantee this would always be possible.

Turk then stated had just received telegram giving preliminary reaction why Turkish govt had not publicly replied to K Jupiter deal suggestion: 1) Turks had only heard of deal through press, 2) Soviets had not addressed them directly, and 3) they did not wish to react in any way to immediate whatever action 'res' desired take in this matter, since they did not wish to give any impression they were a satellite.

..

Acting Secretary General (Colonna) summed up as follows:

1. There was a full NAC consensus on the seriousness of the Soviet menace and threat by placing offensive missiles Cuba and full support for US position.
2. All agreed it most helpful have full OAS support for US action.
3. All agreed that no negotiations should take place until Cuban bases fully liquidated.
4. All are in absolute agreement against any trade re Jupiters.

4.

5. All agreed that SU must be made to realize must drop Cuban missile venture before West can start meaningful negotiations which could take place if Cuba settled.

6. All NAC members wished to maintain continuous contact and meet as often as possible in order to assure collective backing of all NAC members for action taken in this crisis.

While Colonna did not emphasize in his summary, it was most clear desire of permreps that once Cuba problem settled satisfactorily, there should be firm efforts by West for general negotiations with Soviets on all major problems.

F

handwritten notes on White House memos: Oct 27

- a) 1) Must be able to attack--500 sorties
- 2) If we do this Soviet Union will attack Turkish missiles
- 3) If Turkish Jupiter missiles are out
- 4) Response in Black Sea area
- 5)

b) (different writing)

"yes Only to Mare--

Explanation--

Trying to get it back on old track. -- If have to get back on Jupiters--
How should we handle it--

c) Finletter:(handwritten draft, same as Eur draft through first five paras):
(rough slanting handwriting, with capital F)

Given public position Soviets have now taken, if US ~~attack~~ destroys offensive threat in Cuba Soviets may seek retaliate by attack our Jupiters in Turkey, Berlin or other NATO targets. It would, of course, be essential that NATO respond to such an attack in some corresponding manner. This could lead to rapid escalation and unforeseeable consequences.

Two alternatives appear to be open. First: simultaneous or immediately prior to any attack on Cuban offensive weapons announce that the Jupiters in Turkey have been stood down and are inoperable and thus reduce the danger of Soviet retaliation against Turkey.

Memo for Chairman, JCS. 2 Oct 1962

During my meeting with the JCS on Oct 1, 1962, the question arose as to the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented. The following categories would appear to cover the likely possibilities:

- a) Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping enroute to Cuba.
- b) Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.
- ~~xxxx~~ c) (Guantanamo, or attack on US planes or vessels) ; d) popular uprising;
- e) Cuban armed assistance to subversion; f) decision by Pres that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing US national security.

May I have the views of the Chiefs as to the appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and answers to the following:

- a) the operational plans considered appropriate for each contingency...

..We can assume that the political objective in any of these contingencies may be either:

- a) the removal of the threat to US security of Soviet weapon systems in Cuba, or
- b) the removal of the Castro regime and the securing in the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national desires.

Inasmuch as the second objective is the more difficult objective and may be required if the first is to be permanently achieved, attention should be focussed upon a capability to assure the second objective.

RSM

Oct 21, Capt. Hauser to Gen Taylor: Mr. McN would appreciate the views of the JCS on the attached paper:

The President has ordered us to make certain that the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy will not be fired without his further authorization, even in the event of a selective nuclear or non-nuclear attack on these units by the Soviet Union in response to actions we may be taking elsewhere. You should take whatever steps may be necessary to assure that no such action without proper authorization could occur.

response, 21 Oct: It is the view of the JCS that the attached proposed statement should not be implemented for the following reasons:

a. "Regardless of the actions which are taken unilaterally by the US, an attack by the Soviets on the Jupiter missiles positioned in Italy or Turkey would be considered by those ~~may~~ governments to be an attack on them and on NATO; thus, they would feel that we were bound by our Treaty obligations.

b. The release procedures in existence today require: 1) Presidential authorization for the expenditure of nuclear weapons.

2) Within ACE, SACEUR authorization to the custodial detachments for the release of weapons. For the JCS: Riley

Cable from Pres to Stevenson and McCloy, Nov 5, 1962

...The one serious gap in Kuznetsov's proposal respecting missiles is the absence of any reference to nuclear warheads. Our interest in verifying their absence is intense, and you should emphasize to all Soviets that since K spoke to K_{ox} of the presence of such warheads in Cuba, we need assurance here at least equal to those respecting the missiles themselves. This warhead problem highlights the general importance of post-removal verification in Cuba itself. Forty-two missiles is a plausible number, but for us it can be no more than a Soviet estimate and as such it is not a wholly reliable basis for action. In this connection you should not hesitate to press home with Kuznetsov the fact that Soviet deception remains a major element in our reaction to this whole episode. It may be true, as Kuznetsov argues, that the Soviets have no obligation to tell us exactly what they are doing in a country like Cuba, but what actually happened in this case was that they repeatedly gave us assurances of what they were not doing, which proved absolutely false. These assurances came from highest levels.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(Note date; and Nov 6 reply to K letter of Nov 5, along these lines.)

Your insistence on the removal of IL28s, the unacceptability of any submarine support facility, and obvious involvement in SAM complex are all correct and worth repeating insistently.

...Our OAS approved right of surveillance should be kept intact unless and until a wholly new level of confidence in Communist behavior in Cuba can be established.

3) We do not wholly exclude some form of international inspection of US and other Caribbean installations outside Cuba, at a later stage. Ours is an open society, and the principle of reciprocal inspection is one of high value to us if it can be established in the right circumstances. You should emphasize that such reciprocal inspection can only be considered in return for permanently verified absence of any significant Soviet military presence in Cuba. You might try out the notion of removal of SAM sites in this connection.

Questions for Helmut Mundy

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns.
2. Relative influence on expectations of: various Sov statements; Sept 28 letter; Sept 11 statement; McCone; estimates; "high-level Sovietologists; own appreciation of Sov goals, perceptions, tactics.
3. "Most influential "deception". Private channel mentioned by JFK. Any little-known Sov statements on deception; on their expectation that we would discover by recon; on their estimates? Conscious estimate of their willingness to deceive?
4. Why not more specific queries on private channel, or to Dobrynin?
5. Motives, expectations leading to Sept 4 statement? Relation to NSAM 181? Sept 13 warning? (How much deterrent; how much reassurance, on Sept 4; how much answer to political opposition?)
What if expectation of MRBMs had been higher? e.g., if McCone had been around; if Sovs had introduced missiles elsewhere; if estimates had put higher?
6. Effect on later problems, responses, of these JFK warnings, commitments.
7. Personal response to news: surprise, emotion, interpretation, view of responses. Had suspicion been growing? Who did McG tell? What did he do, think about?
8. President's response; above. Where was he Sunday night? Wmz
9. Reaction to deception; interpretation of Sov motives in deception?
10. What if: a) no deception; b) no Pres commitments (e.g., no Keating); c) Sovs had informed JFK: August; Pre-Sept statements; pre Oct 14; pre Oct 22? What if they told Allies;
11. What if Sovs had exploited SAMS or protest to stop U-2s? Role of incidents on Sept 10 meeting. What if missiles had been discovered earlier? Fear of incidents before election; effect of Debyrnin Sept 6 reassurance?
12. What if missiles hadn't been found till they and SAMs were operational?
13. Distribution of Sept 28 letter. Interpretation; effect on later expectations (e.g., on Sov resistance to blockade; on Sov interference in Berlin.)
14. How close to immediate air strike? What would have triggered? How would it have come out?
15. Decision to focus on K/SU rather than Castro; who, when, why?
16. Decision to emphasize deception in private communications to K, then and later.
17. Sequence of attitudes on trades as means of getting missiles out; what was JFK's desire on Saturday afternoon, evening. What arguments were decisive?
18. When would we have released word on Il-28s?
19. Why did K think he could get away with it? Why didn't he believe threats? Why didn't we pick up this possibility? What finally convinced him?

Questions for McNamara

1. Fever chart of expectations, early August on.
2. Attitude to Sept 4 statement; reserve authority; Sept 13 statements. Was crisis necessary?
3. Evaluation of political implications, motives.
4. What if expectation of missiles had been somewhat higher?
5. Attitude to McCone's predictions.
6. Relative influence of: estimates; McCone; Sov statements; own evaluations; other "experts".
- 6a. Influence of U-2 incidents on Sept 10 decisions.
7. On first learning (when?): a) surprise; b) reaction; c) view of alternatives, considerations, payoffs, expectations;
8. Attitude on: immediate strike; warning; political route/ trades; air strike after blockade; likelihood of K backdown. When did blockade--strike (threat) pattern emerge?
9. F-S, Friday night letter; interpretation. Saturday morning letter. Role in fashioning response. Interpretation of U-2 shootdown. Attitude on miss rendering IRMs non-operational, removing them: Saturday night; Sunday.
10. Importance of getting missiles out; importance of method; why? Military vs. political motives.
11. Who did early calculations on requirements for air strike, effects? How close was Pres to that? What would have triggered it?
12. What if K hadn't backed down, or shot more planes, Sunday morning?
13. Was blockade/preparation for strike seen as likely to get missiles out? What hopes for ultimatum?
14. Specific basis for fear of retaliation against Turkey; probability?

Sunday questions:

20. ~~What would have been if?~~ How did election figure in Administration statement responses, recon, dissemination?
21. Why wasn't recon increased from July in view of: a) SU buildup; peculiar features: size, pace, SU personnel (how were these read?); b) McCone; d) commitment to surveillance; e) bad weather; f) incident loss of overhead recon?
22. How could K have improved his chances?
23. Have procedures of SG changed since Cuba?
24. What thinking had been done by SG, Pres, on what we might do--and how effective it might be--prior to Sept 4, 13 statements, or between Sept 20--Oct 16?
25. What if K had not gotten out, or shot more planes, Sunday morning? Chances of initiative on trade? Arguments against trade, Saturday night?
26. Interpretation of F-S; (other? RFK-Dob, Thompson-Dob?) Friday night letter; Saturday morning letter.
27. Expectations of effect of ultimatum. Interpretation of shootdown. Attitude toward political track as of Saturday afternoon.
28. What surprised Khrushchev during crisis; why? What did he expect?
29. What surprised ExComm members during crisis; any of their own or each others' reactions? Allied reactions? Continued SU deception? SU backdown? How well would our own moves have been foreseen earlier? e.g., Presidential choices.
30. Intelligence process in retrospect. Sensitivity over recon incidents; restrictions on dissemination (good?); skepticism toward McCone, agents, refugees; confidence in SI; assumptions on speed on Sov movements;
31. Private channel in retrospect: before crisis.
32. Had we "overcommunicated" a concern for legality (were they too reassured by the legality of their actions and the illegality of ours?): i.e., had we failed to communicate conditions under which we would pursue "illegal" action to protect our power and security?

Questions for S and M:

1. How did the authors' own guesses or preconceptions change in the course of their study? What new patterns emerged in the course of it? What hypotheses were disconfirmed?
2. What divergent, or invalid, beliefs were found to be held by other students, and by participants? What "wrong lessons" may have been learned?
3. What conclusions are sensitive to information not available then to participants, or to some important participants? To public?
4. What sorts of data did not authors not have adequate access to? What sorts couldn't they refer to?
5. What questions are left hanging? What major uncertainties remain?
6. What impressions were acquired as to patterns of dispute, inference or behavior that have also arisen in other crises?
7. What agency differences emerged in interpretation, prediction, policy, management: prior to and during crisis?
8. How well do staff and agency inputs to ExComm reflect the actual preoccupations, goals, predictions of members?
9. What did individual ExComm members fear, if they did nothing?

Source/evidence for:

- 1) Jan report that K intended to ~~xxx~~ improve strategic balance.

Any chance that actual changes in balance of spring '62 seemed to make venture safer (than in fall '61, for example)?

4. How would missile deployment have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany? What circumstances were critical to this; what would have affected result?

e.g., was it important to present US with surprise? How would disclosure have been made? Was it important to surprise U.S. Allies?

Would K have expected JEK to commit himself in Sept? How Might K have avoided this...by reducing secrecy, by private disclosure, public disclosure?

What alternative modes of ~~display~~ procedure were open to K, and why were they probably rejected (if considered)?

5. Given various advantages of successfully installing missiles in Cuba: were these given adequate weight in earlier estimates that they would not install? What do authors conclude about estimating process, preconceptions?

To what extent did it serve SU purposes to put missiles in Cuba, vs. other locations within MRBM range? Did they take into account the peculiar disadvantages, in terms of U.S. readiness to respond, sensitivity?

Did US commitments actually serve as incentive to install, to show up US bluff and demoralize Allies?

6. Given incentives to install, and given reasons for disbelieving JFK commitments: what could JFK have said, and what could US have done, to convince K that deployment was unprofitable? Prior to 1962; prior to Aug-8 1962; between July-Sept 1962?

WHAT IF:

nl. U-2 overflight of Sakhalin of Aug 30 and Chinat loss of 8 Sept (relative importance of these?) had occurred prior to Aug 29?

- a) flight schedule
- b) conclusions/expectations on SAMs
- c) conclusions on missiles
- d) relative weight to collateral sources
- e) sense of urgency; fever chart of crisis
- f) public assertions, commitments; subsequent response.

2. If SAMs had not been discovered Aug 29 (because of weather, coverage, etc.):

- Impact on:
- a) disbelief in collateral sources;
 - b) expectation of missiles
 - c) willingness to check out later reports of missiles.

3. MRBMs had been discovered sooner, around mid-Sept? (clearly non-operational)
Impact on: (fewer)

- a) Shock, surprise;
- b) Willingness to attack immediately (higher, because safer, smaller; or less, because less shocking, less threatening?)
- c) Ability to persuade public and Allies of need for 1) independent action;
- 2) fast action; 3) violent action.
- d) Convergence within ExComm.
- e) Imminence of deadline; effects of longer deadline.

4. MRBMs had been discovered later, or had been installed faster and more completely: warheads, more missiles, complete sites, ~~exploited~~ : a) alert;
(b) non-alert.

Impact on:

- a) Relevance of blockade.
- b) Willingness to attack: increased threat vs. increased risk, difficulty, damage.
- c) Increased shock, and effects of this.
- d) Likelihood of fast, early response; and effects of this.

5. JFK had not made public distinction between offensive/defensive? Had not implied commitment to resist offensive?

WHAT IF:

6. If K had made deployment public, and preceded it with reassuring and justifying moves and statements? (including Cuban request, allegations of US aggressive plans, assurance of Sov control, reference to Turkey, freedom of seas...)

a) Reaction of Allies, public; OAS.

b) Effect of move, if successful, on SU bargaining improvement over Berlin. (If US had acquiesced, it would be under Allied pressure, lack of Sov deception or immediate threat, no explicit JFK commitment; no shock or panic reaction in fall '62;

c) Effect on domestic politics (lacking period of allegation and denial, JFK commitments).

7. K had, prior to Oct 22, leaked facts and reassurances to US Allies, e.g., Britain?

8. K had given no grounds for charging deception? K had actually informed JFK privately?

9. Keating and others had not charged presence of missiles? Presence of buildup?

10. Deployment had taken place in 1961, prior to exposure of Missile Gap? After exposure of Missile Gap?

11. After Castro had exposed, denounced U-2 flights prior to Aug 29? After Aug 29? Activated SAMs? Fired SAM? Shot down U-2?

WHAT DIFFERENCES COULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE TO:

1. K's expectations of US response: a) prior to decision; b) prior to July 62; c) prior to mid-Sept 62; d) prior to Oct 22?
2. US interpretation of SU motives.
3. US expectation of SU response to various US counteractions.
4. US willingness to blockade; b) to follow blockade with attack; c) to precede blockade by attack.
5. Chance that Sov move would trigger an~~nk~~ unwarned US strike.
6. JFK willingness to commit himself to resist offensive deployment.
7. Allied acceptance of US: a) failure to consult
b) failure to inform earlier
c) proposed course of action
d) more violent action
e) trades, if proposed
8. K's degree of belief in JFK's public commitments: in general; regarding Cuba.
9. US willingness to blockade (e.g., belief that deployment was ~~incomplete~~ complete? Prior Allied knowledge? Sov threats--to US, public, Allies? UN attitude? OAS acceptance?)
10. JFK's feeling of having been deceived by K.
11. US willingness to overfly at all, Sept-Oct 62?
12. US disbelief that Sovs would move in MRBMs.

What would have been the result if...

WHAT COULD KHRUSHCHEV HAVE DONE TO:

1. Deter overflights between July--Oct 62? Aug-Sept 62?
2. Prevent JFK from committing US to respond?
3. Defuse US response between 14--22 Oct.
4. Delay recognition of missiles and sites by U-2?

as shown by the fact

that the US was not
immediately provoked; that the US was not

immediately provoked; that the US was not
immediately provoked; that the US was not

Meeting No. 7, 10:00 AM, Oct 27

1. McN intelligence briefing.
2. McN reported on the position of Sov Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He recommended, and the Pres approved, two daylight recon missions over Cuba today---one in the morning and one this afternoon. He again recommended that a recon mission be undertaken tonight. In response to R's request for delay of this mission, the Pres said the recon planes should go on alert, that an announcement of the mission should be drawn up, and that a final decision would be taken this afternoon.
3. It was agreed that the Russians would be informed of the extent of our quarantine zone area privately. Khrushchev could then decide whether to turn back the Soviet tanker *Graznyy*, which will be entering the quarantine zone late today. If the *Graznyy* continued, a decision could then be made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to Havana or whether it should be stopped, searched and released, if, as expected, it had on board no prohibitive material. A decision would also be required as to what action should be taken if the tanker refused to submit to search.
4. At this point in the meeting the partial text of the Soviet public statement was received. It became clear that the terms of the public statement varied considerably from the proposals made by Khrushchev in his personal letter to the President last night. The Pres approved the release of the attached public statement, which was drafted during the meeting. A second and longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later abandoned.)
5. A draft message to Khrushchev was discussed and a final version will be completed for transmission this afternoon.
6. Copies of a proposed leaflet to be dropped in Cuba was circulated at the meeting, but a decision to drop them was deferred.

((Was Oct 27 JFK letter, then, essentially drafted before receiving the Oct 27 K public letter?))

((Note: public statement called for, "as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease--all under effective international verification ((Not for removal of missiles))

Meeting no. 8, 4 PM, Oct 27, 1962

1. McN gave fragmentary reports of today's daylight recon mission. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.
2. Pres directed that planned night recon mission be held up until full report on the daylight mission was received. The night mission was later called off.
3. Pres ordered the immediate dispatch to U Thant of message:
"A number of proposals have been made to you and to the US in the last thirty-six hours. I would appreciate your urgently ascertaining whether the SU is willing immediately to cease work on these bases in Cuba and render the weapons inoperable under UN verification so that various solutions can be discussed."
4. R summarized the air incident in the Far East involving a U-2 overflying the USSR due to navigational difficulties which resulted in Sov fighters being scrambled from a base near the Wrangel Island. The Pres decided not to say anything about the incident unless the Soviets publicized it. (word from McN at 1:47)
5. Letter from Pres to K discussed and approved.
6. T reported on current military planning, recommending that air surveillance be continued. Pres directed that the day air recon mission be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. However, if MIG planes attack the recon planes, US fighters will attack them. Planning is under way for a general air response and for an attack on any SAM site firing on US planes. A decision on the appropriate response will await ~~xxxxxx~~ reports as to whether tomorrow's recon missions encounter opposition and upon replies to messages sent to U Thant and K.
7. A general discussion of how to handle the response to K's public letter to the President, including the question of missiles in Turkey.

No. 9, 9 PM

McN recom., Pres approved, callup of 24 air reserve squadrons. Pres directed Stev tell U Thant that Sov tanker was approaching the quarantine zone and reminding U T of Sov statement that Sov ships should not enter Cuban waters.

3. Discussion of next steps including calling up of US snips and the addition of POL to the list of prohibited goods.
4. Pres read a message from General Norstad which presented the difficulty for NATO of any trade tying Cuban missiles to Turkish missiles.
5. There was a general discussion of a draft message to Amb. Finletter giving him guidance as to his presentation to the NATO meeting of Perm-Reps called for tomorrow. It was agreed that this NATO meeting should be limited to reporting on actions we have taken and reviewing NATO problems arising out of K's public letter.

John Hyland: in EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; SU) 5 June

{kx

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 10-17 Oct.
2. Reaction when told.
3. Interplay with MCC (MCC certainty; theory; a nut; Rusk reaction)
4. Memo over weekend; Kent attitude.
5. Konler interview: acted as if didn't know.
6. Turkey: our ~~base~~ strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)
7. Attitude to news of 11-20's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.
8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMS there).
9. ~~xx~~ MCC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.
10. MCC attitude; wrong guesses.
11. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk; ~~xxxxxx~~
2) Underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wishful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;
12. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for MCC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and MCC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.
13. McC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule/ Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.
14. K interview with Gandni; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. question whether war would have followed.
15. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (though memo to MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SU). No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.
16. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMS before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.
17. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for MCC;
18. Process of producing SNIE, NIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sohn) aid solicited, conference; USIB
19. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? (He should have anticipated threats, deployment, etc; should have hedged more against possibility)

John Whitman:

1. Process: ONE, BNE, USIB ; amount of coordination; role of DCI.
2. Unprecedented: Rostow panel, assignment of Whitman, sharp split between E DCI and ONE (roles of Harris, Hitchcock; Tidwell?)
3. Issues on SWIE: likelihood of Sov military response; relative likelihood of strong response to invasion, limited military attack.
4. Feeling by 22 Oct on likely Sov response to limited, controlled US response. reaction to blockade proposal.
5. W. reaction to news (told, "MCC was right") ; prior commitment to position because of McC prodding of Kent.
6. Fear of effect on McC/ONE.
7. Do analysts get timely, comprehensive info on private, verbal messages to Su? (didn't know about F-S). Do they ask, what tacit info is our whole posture and pattern of behavior and statements affecting opponent's expectations?

8.